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ABSTRACT
Background. Based on the developing clinical and legal literature, and using the framework adopted
in draft legislation, capacity to make a valid decision about a clinically required blood test was
investigated in three groups of people with a ‘mental disability ’ (i.e. mental illness (chronic
schizophrenia), ‘ learning disability ’ (‘mental retardation’, or intellectual or developmental
disability), or, dementia) and a fourth, comparison group.
Methods. The three ‘mental disability ’ groups (Nfl 20 in the ‘ learning disability ’ group, Nfl 21 in
each of the other two groups) were recruited through the relevant local clinical services ; and through
a phlebotomy clinic for the ‘general population’ comparison group (Nfl 20). The decision-making
task was progressively simplified by presenting the relevant information as separate elements and
modifying the assessment of capacity so that responding became gradually less dependent on
expressive verbal ability.
Results. Compared with the ‘general population’ group, capacity to make the particular decision
was significantly more impaired in the ‘ learning disability ’ and ‘dementia’ groups. Importantly,
however, it was not more impaired among the ‘mental illness ’ group. All the groups benefited as
the decision-making task was simplified, but at different stages. In each of the ‘mental disability ’
groups, one participant benefited only when responding did not require any expensive verbal ability.
Conclusions. Consistent with current views, capacity reflected an interaction between the decision-
maker and the demands of the decision-making task. The findings have implications for the way in
which decisions about health care interventions are sought from people with a ‘mental disability ’.
The methodology may be extended to assess capacity to make other legally-significant decisions.
INTRODUCTION
The ethical principle of respect for individuals
and their right to self-determination is embodied
in the requirement in common law jurisdictions
for clinicians to obtain consent before under-
taking any health care intervention (cardozo j
in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital
211 New York Reports 125 (1914) ; lord goff in
Re F [1990] 2 Law Reports: Appeal Cases 1 ;
lord donaldson mr in Re T (adult: refusal of
" Address for correspondence: Ms I. C. H. Clare, Department of
Psychiatry (Section of Developmental Psychiatry), University of
Cambridge, Douglas House, 18b Trumpington Road, Cambridge
CB2 2AH.
treatment) [1992] 4 All England Law Reports
649). However, an individual’s decision to give
or withhold consent cannot be considered valid
unless he or she has the capacity to make that
decision.
In English law (i.e. the law in England and
Wales), as in many other jurisdictions, there is a
presumption that adults (that is, people aged 18
years or more) have capacity. Nevertheless, this
presumption may be called into question, par-
ticularly if he or she has a ‘mental disability ’
(the term used by the Law Commission (England
and Wales) – hereafter, the Law Commission,
1995; see Fig. 1, and subsequently adopted in
the draft Mental Incapacity Bill), and may
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prompt a clinical assessment. The traditional
approaches to such assessments, based solely on
the ‘outcome’ of the individual’s decision-
making or on his or her ‘status ’ (or diagnosis),
have been rejected on both empirical and
conceptual grounds; instead, a ‘ functional ’
approach is now preferred (Hoggett, 1994;
Arscott, 1997; Grisso & Appelbaum, 1998a).
This focuses on the person’s relevant abilities
and the extent to which these match the demands
of a particular decision-making task. Never-
theless, diagnosis remains important as a source
of valuable information about the cause, prog-
nosis andpossible remediation of the individual’s
abilities (Grisso, 1986). A functional approach
has been adopted by many common law juris-
dictions (President’s Commission, 1983; Weis-
stub, 1990; Creyke, 1995; Scottish Law Com-
mission, 1995; Grisso & Appelbaum, 1998a), as
well as within the English legal framework (Re C
(Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 1 Family Law
Reports, 31; Department of Health and Welsh
Office, 1993; Law Commission, 1995; Lord
Chancellor’s Department, 1997, 1999).
Though a universally accepted standard for
capacity to make health-care decisions remains
elusive (Wong et al. 1999), there is a consensus
that the following abilities are particularly
important : retaining and understanding infor-
mation about the procedure; appreciating that
the information is of personal relevance; weigh-
ing up the information to reach a decision; and
communicating that decision (Appelbaum &
Grisso, 1988, 1995; Weisstub, 1990; Law Com-
mission, 1995; British Medical Association}The
Law Society, 1995; Berg et al. 1996; Grisso &
Appelbaum, 1998a).
Previous empirical studies, mainly from North
America, have noted some impairments in
capacity to consent to treatment among people
with a ‘mental disability ’. These studies have
included participants with a mental illness, such
as schizophrenia or depression (Grossman &
Sommers, 1980; Irwin et al. 1985; Grisso &
Appelbaum, 1991, 1995a ; Schachter et al. 1994;
Grisso et al. 1995), or with dementia (Marson et
al. 1995a, b). A small number of studies (Morris
et al. 1993; Arscott et al. 1999) have included
men and women with the diagnostic criteria for
a ‘ learning disability ’ (Dorrell, 1991; known in
other countries as ‘mental retardation’ (Luckas-
son et al. 1992), or intellectual or developmental
disability).Across the different groups, it appears
that there are particular problems in under-
standing and retaining information relating to
the decision to be made, but impairments have
been found in all the relevant abilities. Never-
theless, despite this general trend, impaired
performance by participants with a ‘mental
disability ’ is by no means inevitable. In part, it
is related to the nature and severity of the
clinical condition. For example, among people
with a mental disorder associated with psychosis,
the ability to give consent has been found to be
related to the degree of thought disorder,
conceptual disorganization and unusual thought
content (Irwin et al. 1985; Schachter et al. 1994;
Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995a). In addition, the
complexity for the person of the particular
decision-making task (Grisso & Appelbaum,
1991) and the ability or combination of abilities
used as the legal criterion of capacity (Grisso &
Appelbaum, 1995b ; Marson et al. 1995b) are
important. Furthermore, as predicted from a
functional approach, the way in which relevant
information is presented to the decision-maker
is crucial : regardless of whether or not the
person has a ‘mental disability ’, material seems
easier to understand when it is presented in
simple language and as separate elements rather
than as uninterrupted text (Grisso & Appel-
baum, 1995a).
Given the variety of clinical conditions en-
compassed by the term ‘mental disability ’, and
the range of aetiologies, psychological impair-
ments, and social disadvantages associated with
different diagnoses (see review by Murphy &
Clare, 1995), it cannot be assumed that indi-
viduals with different clinical conditions respond
similarly to the same decision-making task.
However, this assumption has never been tested
directly within a single study. Further infor-
mation about the performance, and the pattern
of responding, of people with different diagnoses
may help in the development of specific remedial
strategies. The aims of this exploratory study
were two-fold: first, to investigate and compare
the performance of three groups of participants
with a ‘mental disability ’ (mental illness, learn-
ing disability, or dementia) on the same decision-
making task using the same assessment meth-
odology. It was expected that the performance
of each of the three groups would be significantly
poorer than that of their counterparts in the
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general population, but no specific hypotheses
were made about the extent of the impairment
or the pattern of responding. The second aim
was to assess whether, by simplifying the
presentation of information and modifying the
response so that it became less dependent on
verbal ability, capacity might be improved. It
was expected that all the groups would benefit
from this process.
METHOD
Ethical considerations
Approval for the study, which was carried out
for research purposes and did not affect sub-
sequent treatment, was obtained from the local
research ethics committee. It was anticipated
that some potential participants would not have
the capacity to decide whether or not to
participate in the study. As the involvement of
these individuals was crucial, it was decided,
following discussions with medical lawyers and
the multi-disciplinary Advisory Board estab-
lished to oversee the project, that they would not
be excluded. The decision was consistent with
current approaches to research (Medical Re-
search Council, 1991, paras. 6\1\3, 6\3\2; Law
Commission, 1995, para 6\34) that involves
people who are not able to consent to par-
ticipation, and subsequent publication (Doyal,
1997).
Consent was always sought, using simple
written information about the study which was
read out to every potential participant and
supplemented by a verbal explanation. Wherever
possible, the main carer of participants in the
‘mental disability ’ groups was also involved.
Men and women without capacity to consent
were not asked to participate unless they could
show that they agreed to take part. Great care
was taken throughout to ensure that participants
were assenting.
Participants
Potential participants were adults (18 years or
older) who had been advised by their general
practitioner or psychiatrist to have a blood test
for general health reasons or to monitor blood
levels of medication. Convenience samples of
the three ‘mental disability ’ groups were re-
cruited through the relevant local clinical
services. A fourth ‘general population’ group
was recruited from the outpatient phlebotomy
clinic of the local district general hospital.
Potential participants were excluded if they: (i)
met inclusion criteria for more than one of the
groups; (ii) had no verbal expressive communi-
cation; (iii) could not be assessed prior to their
appointment for the blood test ; and (iv) were
having blood tests where the implications were
potentially grave (for example, HIV tests) or
required a complicated explanation (for ex-
ample, haematological monitoring for clozapine
therapy).
The three groups with a ‘mental disability ’
comprised a ‘mental illness ’ group (Nfl 21),
who had at least a 5-year history of diagnosed
schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder, using
ICD-10 criteria ; a ‘ learning disability ’ group (N
fl 20) ; and a ‘dementia’ group (Nfl 21). The
presence of a learning disability or dementia was
confirmed from health records and by assess-
ment using establishment instruments. Seven
people were detained in hospital under the
Mental Health Act 1983. Six of these were in the
‘mental illness ’ group; the seventh was a man
with a learning disability who was admitted for
an affective disorder. At the time of partici-
pation, he was mentally well and was in hospital
for a social reason. To exclude a ‘mental
disability ’, the ‘general population’ group (Nfl
20) were screened using medical and educational
history and a brief mental state examination.
Reflecting the local population, all except three
persons (one each in the ‘ learning disability ’,
‘mental illness ’, and the comparison groups)
were native English speakers ; all were fluent in
English.
Assessment of decision-making capacity
Decision-making task
The decision about consent to having a blood
test was chosen for the following reasons. First,
since the intervention was clinically required,
rather than hypothetical (Morris et al. 1993;
Marson et al. 1995a, b), the decision-making
task was of practical and emotional relevance to
the participants. Secondly, it is legally significant.
A blood test taken without the consent of a
person with capacity is an assault. Where the
person is without capacity, the decision whether
it was necessary in his or her best interests must
be made, and justified, by the clinician. Thirdly,
it is a frequent health care decision for both
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Fig. 1. Definition of incapacity (Law Commission, 1995).
people with, and those without, a ‘mental
disability ’, thereby allowing a direct comparison
between groups.
Criteria for capacity
Following consultation with the Advisory Board
and others, we used the criteria for the legal
definition of ‘ incapacity ’ (see Fig. 1) suggested
by the Law Commission for England and Wales
(Law Commission, 1995) and adopted in the
draft Mental Incapacity Bill (Lord Chancellor’s
Department, 1997, 1999).
Decision-making assessment
Drawing on the methodology used in the
MacArthur Treatment Competence Study
(Grisso et al. 1995; Grisso & Appelbaum,
1998a, b), and in consultation with senior
phlebotomists, medical practitioners and a
medical lawyer, an information sheet and a
standardized semi-structured interview were de-
vised."
Information sheet
The sheet was designed to met legal require-
ments for appropriate disclosure and provided
the following five elements of information about
a blood test : (i) the ‘purpose’ of the test ; (ii) the
nature of the ‘procedure’ ; (iii) the ‘risks ’ of
having the test ; (iv) the ‘risks ’ of not having the
" A copy of the Decision Assessment Measure (including the
information sheet) may be obtained, on request, from I. C. H. Clare.
test (‘ risks ’ of saying ‘no’) ; and (v)‘voluntari-
ness ’ (the principle of a free choice in making a
decision about the procedure).
The information sheet was prepared in two
versions, relating either to general health
screening (e.g. full blood count, thyroid func-
tion) or medication level monitoring (e.g. anti-
convulsant or lithium levels). Both versions were
written in simple language and printed in large
font. The complexity of the information was
analysed with an established formula (Flesch,
1948), previously used for medical and legal
texts (Ley, 1977; Sherr, 1986; Clare & Gud-
jonsson, 1992). It was considerably less complex
than the UK’s best-selling tabloid newspaper.
The format was prepared as a continuous
passage and as separate elements.
Decision assessment measure
The semi-structured interview schedule was
based on the criteria for ‘mental incapacity ’
proposed by the Law Commission (1995, see
Fig. 1) and subsequently adopted in draft
legislation (Lord Chancellor’s Department,
1997, 1999). It was designed to provide a
framework to elicit information about partici-
pants’ skills in ‘understanding and retaining
elements of information’, and ‘communicating
a choice ’. A staged approach, involving a
maximum of four stages, was used (see Fig. 2).
Spontaneous account Participants were asked
what they knew about blood tests before any
information disclosure was used to establish a
baseline.
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SPONTANEOUS ACCOUNT
Uninterrupted Disclosure (UD)
followed by
PARAPHRASED RECALL
Without
capacity
With
capacity
Element Disclosure (ED)
followed by
PARAPHRASED RECALL+RECOGNITION
NON-VERBAL DEMONSTRATION
Fig. 2. Summary of procedure for assessment of decision-making capacity.
Uninterrupted disclosure (UD) The entire in-
formation sheet was given to participants to
follow while it was also read aloud (to avoid the
confounding effects of sensory impairments or
literacy problems). They were then asked for
‘paraphrased recall ’, an account of the in-
formation in their own words. This is an
established psychological method (Grisso et al.
1995; Grisso & Appelbaum, 1998a, b) for
assessing understanding of material relevant to
decision-making.
Element disclosure (ED) This again involved
‘paraphrased recall ’, but after presentation of
each element of the information sheet.
Recognition In a much less verbally demanding
task, participants were asked to identify each of
a series of statements as the ‘same as’ or
‘different from’ the information on the sheet.
Non-verbal demonstration Participants were
asked to show the procedure of the blood test,
using materials chosen from a selection that
included irrelevant medical ‘distractor ’ items.
This enabled understanding of the procedure to
be examined independently of verbal skills.
All participants undertook the ‘spontaneous
account’, ‘paraphrased recall after UD’, and
‘non-verbal demonstration’ stages. However,
following piloting, participants whose capacity
was evident did not undertake the ‘ED’ (see Fig.
2).
The participants’ responses were written ver-
batim so that they were available for exam-
ination by others. Using operationalized criteria,
they were then scored by the interviewer
(J.G.W.), an experienced practising psychiatrist,
against a threshold of minimal requirements
established by clinical and legal consensus.
Scoring of understanding and retention of the
five elements of information in the information
sheet used a 3-point system derived from
Appelbaum et al. (1981). A 2-point score
indicated a response that was totally acceptable,
factually correct, and clearly relevant; a 1-point
score, a response which was partially acceptable,
factually correct or relevant; a zero score was a
response that was unacceptable, factually in-
correct or irrelevant. Recognition tasks were also
scored on a 3-point scale : where four statements
were presented, a score of 2 was given for four
correct answers ; 1 for three correct ; 0 for two or
fewer correct answers. Where two statements
were presented (in the ‘voluntariness ’ section), a
score of 2 was given for two correct answers ; 0
for one or fewer. It should be emphasized that
these scores were used for the statistical analysis
and to support the interviewer’s clinical judge-
ment of each participant’s capacity overall and
at each stage. However, they were not translated
directly into determinations of capacity.
Other assessments
The severity of the participants’ ‘mental dis-
ability ’ was assessed, as follows: ‘Mental ill-
ness ’, the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS)
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(Overall, 1988) ; ‘Learning disability ’, Verbal IQ
(VIQ) prorated from the Vocabulary, Compre-
hension, Similarities and Digit Span subtests
of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised
(WAIS-R) (Wechsler, 1981) (the first three
subtests correlate highly with VIQ, while the
Digit Span is a good measure of short-term
memory retention (Shum et al. 1990)) ; ‘Demen-
tia ’, Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE)
(Folstein et al. 1975) ; ‘General population’, to
exclude a ‘mental disability ’ the participants
completed the BPRS, the four WAIS-R subtests
and the MMSE.
In addition, all participants or their carers (as
appropriate) were asked for information about
their employment and educational histories, and
their previous experience of blood tests.
Procedure
Each person was seen individually : participants
in the ‘mental disability ’ groups were seen in
their hospital ward, community residence, or
day-service ; for general population partici-
pants, at the phlebotomy clinic. First, relevant
demographic and background information was
obtained from the participants themselves ;
where necessary, this was supplemented by
interviewing carers or drawn from health
records. Before the date on which the blood test
was due to be performed, capacity to consent to
this procedure was assessed through an audio-
taped interview using the Decision Assessment
Measure. Finally, the relevant psychological
assessment(s) was carried out.
For the three groups of participants with a
‘mental disability ’, at least two separate sessions
were used to complete all parts of the assessment.
Four participants (three with dementia and one
with a mental illness) appeared distressed. The
session was ended immediately. Two of these
individuals later completed the entire assess-
ment. No participant subsequently did not
consent or assent to a blood test.
Statistical analysis
To establish inter-rater reliability, four audio-
tapes were selected at random from each group.
Independent ratings were carried out by a second
psychiatrist (A.J.H.), who had no prior in-
formation about the group membership of the
16 participants. Judgements about the partici-
pants’ capacity overall, and at each stage, and
scores for each of the decision-making abilities
and elements of the information were compared
to produce a reliability measure using kappa
coefficients. Where the table is asymmetric, the
kappa coefficient is undefined, so Spearman
correlations were used instead.
Using the SSPS for Windows statistical
package (SPSS-Inc, 1995), comparisons between
the four participant groups were performed by
ANOVA for continuous variables and by chi-
squared or Fisher exact tests for categorical
variables. To assess participants’ progress
through the stages of assessment, the McNemar
test was used to compare participants across two
stages, and Cochran’s Q test for comparisons
across four stages (as applicable). The Friedman
test, comparing the averages of item score ranks
for each participant, was used to establish which
items of information were most difficult to
understand.
RESULTS
Participant characteristics
Table 1 shows the age range, gender balance,
and mean scores of the four groups on the
assessments of ‘mental disability ’. In the ‘mental
illness ’ group, 19 (90–5%) participants had a
diagnosis of schizophrenia, while two (9–5%)
had received a diagnosis of schizoaffective
disorder.
Since the mean BPRS score (42–5; s.d. 9–3)
was " 40, the score usually associated with a
need for in-patient treatment (Grisso & Appel-
baum, 1995a), this indicated significant psy-
chopathology. The mean prorated Verbal IQ
score (60–2; s.d. 8–8) of the ‘ learning disability ’
group suggested that their intellectual function-
ing lay towards the lower end of the mild
learning disability range. Of the ‘dementia’
group, 11 (52%) people had a diagnosis of
Alzheimer’s disease, with eight (38%) having a
diagnosis of vascular dementia and two (10%)
of unspecified dementia with mixed symptoms.
The mean MMSE score (11–9; s.d. 5–2) indicated
at least moderate dementia. In contrast, for the
‘general population’ group, the mean scores on
all three assessments were within the normal or
average range; this suggested that none of them
was a person with a ‘mental disability ’.
There were no statistically significant dif-
ferences between the three ‘mental disability ’
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Table 1. Characteristics of participant groups
Participant group
Mental illness
(Nfl 21)
Learning
disability
(Nfl 20)
Dementia
(Nfl 21)
General
population
(Nfl 20)
Mean age 40–1 (s.d. 10–6) 36–8 (s.d. 12–1) 82–2 (s.d. 8–3) 53–4 (s.d. 17–5)
Gender (% male) 76% 70% 48% 55%
Severity of ‘mental
disability ’ (mean
scores)*
BPRS: 42–5 (s.d. 9–3) WAIS-R prorated
Verbal IQ: 60–2
(s.d. 8–8)
MMSE: 11–9 (s.d. 5–2) BPRS: 19 (s.d. 2) ;
WAIS-R: 95 (s.d. 12) ;
MMSE: 29 (s.d. 1)
* BPRS, Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale ; WAIS-R, Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised; MMSE, Mini-Mental State Examination.
 All scores within the ‘normal ’}‘average ’ range.
groups combined and the ‘general population’
group in the mean chronological ages or
proportions of men. Self-report and interviews
with carers indicated that the ‘mental illness ’,
‘dementia’ and ‘general population’ groups
were similar in terms of their most prestigious
employment and academic qualifications. All
but one participant (in the ‘ learning disability ’
group) had previous experience of a blood test.
Inter-rater reliability
The level of agreement on overall capacity was
satisfactory (jfl 0–87). The only disagreement
related to a participant whom both raters
regarded as of borderline capacity. At each
stage, there was complete agreement about the
participants’ capacity. The overall inter-rater
agreement for each of the decision-making
abilities and elements of the information was
satisfactory, as follows: understanding and
retaining elements of information, (i) purpose
jfl 0–77, (ii) procedure rfl 0–99, (iii) risks jfl
0–43, (iv) risks of saying ‘no’ jfl 0–66 and (v)
voluntariness jfl 1–0; making a decision based
on information given, jfl 0–60; and communi-
cating a choice, jfl 1–0.
Decision-making capacity
Decision-making capacity among different
groups
Table 2 shows the proportions of each group
judged overall to have capacity to make a
decision about a blood test. As expected,
compared with the ‘general population’ group,
significantly smaller proportions of the ‘ learning
disability ’ and the ‘dementia’ groups were
judged as having capacity. However, statistical
analysis indicated no significant difference be-
tween the proportions of participants with
capacity in the ‘mental illness ’ and ‘general
population’ groups. Neither did it reveal any
significant difference between the proportions of
participants with capacity among those detained
under the Mental Health Act 1983 and their
counterparts.
Patterns of decision-making abilities
To identify which of the relevant abilities were
most difficult for each of the three ‘mental
disability ’ groups, within-group comparisons
were carried out between participants with and
without capacity. Within the ‘mental illness ’
group, the only significant difference lay in the
ability to ‘make a decision based on information
given’ (P! 0–05). Similarly, this ability dif-
ferentiated those with and without capacity in
the ‘ learning disability ’ and ‘dementia’ groups
(P! 0–001 for both groups). However, in ad-
dition, participants with capacity in these two
groups were also significantly better able to
‘Understand and retain’ the relevant infor-
mation (P! 0–05).
Understanding and retaining different
elements of information
To identify whether some items of the relevant
information were more difficult than others, the
performance of participants within each group
was compared, regardless of their response to
the decision-making assessment. The same pat-
tern was displayed by the ‘mental illness ’ (v#fl
37–9, dffl 4, P! 0–001) and ‘ learning disability ’
groups (v#fl 31–5, dffl 4, P! 0–001). In order,
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Table 2. Outcome of the assessment of
capacity to make a decision about a blood test
Participant
group
Number
with capacity
N (%)
Comparison with
‘general
population’
group
Mental illness
(Nfl21)
19 (90) Fisher’s exact test,
not significant
Learning disability
(Nfl 20)
13 (65) Fisher’s exact test,
P! 0–01
Dementia
(Nfl 21)
7 (33) v#fl 20–25 (dffl 1),
P! 0–001
General population
(Nfl 20)
20 (100)
from best to least well understood, the pattern
was: procedure"purpose" voluntariness"
risks of procedure" risks of saying ‘no’. While,
among the participants with dementia, the
pattern differed slightly (v#fl 27–0, dffl 4, P!
0–001) : procedure" voluntariness"purpose"
risks of procedure" risks of saying ‘no’, again,
‘procedure’ was the easiest item, while ‘risks ’
and ‘risks of saying ‘no’ ’ were the most difficult.
No significant trend was evident in the ‘general
population’ group.
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Fig. 3. Progression through ‘verbal ’ stages of decision-making assessment. (E, Mental illness ; +, learning disability ; _,
dementia ; and, U, general population.)
Impact of simplifying the decision-making
task
Fig. 3 shows, in the form of cumulative
percentages, the proportion of each group
judged as with capacity as the decision-making
task was simplified (the non-verbal demon-
stration stage is not included as it assessed only
understanding of a single element, ‘procedure’).
Overall, as expected, capacity improved as the
decision-making task was simplified. The pro-
vision of information (UD) was the most
effective strategy (v#fl 9, dffl 1, 1-tailed P!
0–01) accounting for a shift to capacity for nine
people (five from the ‘mental illness ’ group,
three from the ‘ learning disability ’ group and
one from the ‘general population group’). As
the task was simplified, capacity improved
significantly for the ‘mental illness ’ group
(Cochran’s Qfl 14–4, dffl 3, P! 0–01), but not
for the participants with a learning disability or
dementia. Qualitatively, though, they responded
very differently. In the ‘dementia’ group, neither
UD nor the two procedures following ED
increased the proportion of participants with
capacity. In contrast, while UD benefited some
of the ‘ learning disability ’ group, the effects of
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the two procedures following ED were mixed:
on each, one participant improved and one
deteriorated.
Importantly, three participants (one from each
of the ‘mental disability ’ groups) were only able
to demonstrate understanding of the procedural
element through the non-verbal demonstration.
Without this, they would have been judged as
without capacity because their verbal skills were
so severely impaired.
DISCUSSION
In this study, capacity to make a decision about
the same health care intervention among men
and women with one of the three different
clinical conditions associated with a ‘mental
disability ’ and a ‘general population’ group was
compared on the same measure. The measure is
systematic, and would be legally and ethically
defensible since it both provides a framework
for assessing all the abilities and elements of
information believed, in England & Wales, to be
relevant to the particular health care decision
(Law Commission, 1995) and is consistent with
current guidance to clinicians (BMA}The Law
Society, 1995). It is, however, important to em-
phasize that, contrary to the concerns sometimes
expressed (Kapp & Mossman, 1996), any as-
sessment measure can only be an aid to clinical
judgement. The court is the ultimate arbiter of
capacity.
As expected from previous studies of people
with a ‘ learning disability ’ (Morris et al. 1993)
or ‘dementia’ (Marson et al. 1995a), the
performance of these two groups on the measure
was more impaired than that of their ‘general
population’ counterparts. Nevertheless, in both
groups, some participants had capacity to make
a decision about having a blood test even at the
initial (Spontaneous Account) stage. Moreover,
importantly, and in contrast with previous
studies (e.g. Grisso & Appelbaum, 1991, 1995a),
there were no significant differences between the
performance of the ‘mental illness ’ group and
that of their peers in the general population.
These findings are particularly striking given
that the ‘mental disability ’ of our participants
with either dementia or schizophrenia}schizo-
affective disorder was more significantly more
severe than in some important previous studies
(e.g. Grisso & Appelbaum, 1991 (though not
Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995a) ; Marson et al.
1995; no relevant comparison data available for
people with a learning disability in Morris et al.
1993; Arscott et al. 1999). It is most likely that
the explanation lies in the limited demands of
the decision-making task we used and its
familiarity to all but one of the participants.
Nevertheless, the results add to the empirical
evidence for a rejection of a ‘status ’ approach,
whether based on participants’ diagnoses or
their legal position under mental health legis-
lation, and support a ‘ functional approach’.
There were some similarities across the three
‘mental disability ’ groups. Regardless of di-
agnosis, the main difference between individuals
with and without capacity lay in their ability to
‘Make a Decision Based on the Information
Given’. However, it cannot be assumed that a
lack of ability reflected the same difficulties in all
the groups. Compared with other conceptual-
izations (Appelbaum & Grisso, 1988, 1995;
Weisstub, 1990; Berg et al. 1996; Grisso &
Appelbaum, 1998), which specifically refer to
‘appreciation’ and the ‘ability to manipulate the
information’, the Law Commission’s definition
of this complex aspect of decision-making is
very broad, requiring only that the choice seems
to reflect the person’s understanding of the five
key elements of a legally acceptable disclosure,
including the likely consequences, and is not
divorced from it by the impact of the ‘mental
disability ’ (Law Commission, 1995, para. 3.17).
The clinical implication of such a definition is
that it may be hard to identify, and therefore
to alleviate, the difficulties underlying any
apparent impairments in this ability ; further
investigation is needed.
Across the three ‘mental disability ’ groups,
there was also a broadly similar pattern of
difficulties in understanding and retaining
particular elements of the information sheet.
Understanding of the ‘procedure’ was easiest
to understand, perhaps reflecting its purely
‘ factual ’ nature. In contrast, the ‘risks of the
procedure’ and ‘risks of saying no’ appeared
particularly problematical. Given that these
‘risks ’ were reported by the ‘general population’
group, it is unlikely that they were too trivial to
mention. From previous studies (e.g. Grisso &
Appelbaum, 1991; Morris et al. 1993; Marson et
al. 1996a), it seems most likely that these more
complex and abstract elements were too cog-
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nitively demanding. An intervention strategy
which makes these elements more ‘concrete ’
(for example, by using pictures) may be helpful ;
we are currently investigating this possibility.
Nevertheless, there were some differences in
the pattern of responses of the three groups of
persons with a ‘mental disability ’. In terms of
their understanding and retention of the different
elements of information relevant to the decision,
in reverse of the other groups, the participants
with dementia found the ‘purpose’ of a blood
test more problematical than ‘voluntariness ’.
One possibility is that, since the purpose of a
blood test may be different on different
occasions, it requires new learning – a task likely
to be particularly difficult for this group (Brandt
& Rich, 1995). The most striking difference in
the pattern of responses lay in the response to
the simplification of the task. With the exception
of the individual who benefited from the non-
verbal demonstration stage, participants with
dementia who were without capacity initially
were not assisted by any part of this process. In
contrast, for both the other two groups with a
‘mental disability ’ and the comparison group,
the proportion with capacity increased as the
decision-making task was simplified progress-
ively (see Fig. 3). Again, these findings support
a ‘ functional approach’, with capacity reflecting
an interaction between the individual’s relevant
abilities and the demands of the particular
decision-making task (Grisso, 1986), implying
that capacity may be maximized by assisting the
person to develop his or her relevant abilities
and}or by simplifying the task. We attempted to
simplify the task in two ways: by presenting
information about the decision, first, in un-
interrupted form, and then as constituent
elements ; and by limiting the verbal demands of
the response by including recognition and non-
verbal demonstration. The most effective part of
this process was the provision of simple, clear,
information about a blood test. The implication
is that, in everyday practice, clinicians might use
this basic strategy to maximize capacity to make
decisions about health care interventions. Our
finding that three people were only able to
demonstrate capacity when they were provided
with an opportunity for non-verbal demon-
stration of the procedure involved in a blood test
suggests, however, that it may be flawed to rely
on assessments requiring sophisticated verbal ex-
pressive skills. Contrary to the presumption of
capacity in English law, and the intentions of the
Law Commission (1995), such assessments pro-
vide too many ‘false negatives ’ and may
disempower people with a ‘mental disability ’. A
challenge for the future is to explore further the
development of non-verbal techniques for dem-
onstrating a broader range of the abilities and
skills relevant to capacity. It may be helpful to
draw on some of the methodologies for assessing
choice-making by people with severe or pro-
found learning disabilities (Lancioni et al. 1996).
The findings of this study need to be con-
sidered in the context of the several method-
ological limitations. The groups were small and,
since they were recruited as convenience samples,
it is uncertain how far they were representative
of the underlying populations of people with a
‘mental disability ’. No attempt was made to
match the severity of the ‘mental disability ’
between groups. In addition, the limitations of
the Decision Assessment Measure need to be
considered. Developing the pioneering work of
Grisso and Appelbaum and their colleagues in
the USA (Grisso et al. 1995; Grisso & Appel-
baum, 1995a, 1998a), we have devised a
systematic measure that provides a framework
for assessing capacity to consent to a blood test.
So far, it appears, overall, to have satisfactory
inter-rater reliability. The limited agreement on
some of the elements may reflect the second
rater’s difficulties in making assessments from
audiotapes ; ideally, videotapes should be used
for inter-rater agreement. While the content of
the assessment was developed through extensive
consultation with clinicians and medical lawyers
and therefore examines the relevant decision-
making abilities, it is difficult to address validity
fully because of the lack of a universally accepted
legal definition of incapacity and uncertainty
about the abilities required and the relative
importance which they should be accorded.
However, the measure has good face validity.
Importantly, participants with a ‘mental dis-
ability ’ did not find it either demeaning or
distressing. Some individuals in the ‘ learning
disability ’ group became confused by the rep-
etition as the stages progressed but it is not clear
whether this reflected their cognitive limitations
or the impact of the questioning on their
confidence in their original responses. Further
investigation of this phenomenon is needed in
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developing the measure further and assessing its
use in clinical practice.
For those jurisdictions in which capacity is a
crucial determinant of individuals’ rights to
autonomy and respect, the findings are of
relevance to the important public policy goal
that people with a ‘mental disability ’ should be
encouraged and enabled, as far as possible, to
make decisions or themselves. In the United
Kingdom, bills relating to decision-making by
adults without capacity have been drafted (Law
Commission, 1995; Scottish Law Commission,
1995; Lord Chancellor’s Department, 1997,
1999), and are being considered for introduction
into our legislation. As a result of these
developments, it is likely to become increasingly
important for clinicians to consider the capacity
of people with a diagnosis associated with a
‘mental disability ’ to make decisions about
health care interventions. While capacity is task-
specific, the knowledge gained through the
development of the measure used in this study
may be applicable to other areas of decision-
making.
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Disabilities, Lifespan Healthcare NHS Trust
(Cambridge) ; Professor Ian Kennedy; Professor
Thomas Grisso; and the anonymous reviewers for
their valuable comments on a previous version The
study was carried out as part of a project funded by
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